Isolation and presentation of untrusted data

ABSTRACT

Architecture that provides a secure environment in which data (e.g., code, instructions, files, images, etc.) can be opened and run by a client application. Once opened the data can be viewed (in a “protected view”) by the user without incurring risk to other client processing and systems. Accordingly, the architecture mitigates malicious attacks by enabling users to preview untrusted and potentially harmful data (e.g., files) in a low risk manner. Files opened in the protected view are isolated from accessing key resources on the client computer and provides the user a safer way to read files that can contain dangerous content. The protected view also provides a seamless user experience. The user is unaware that the client is operating on data in a different mode and allows for the reduction of security prompts.

CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATION

This application is a continuation of U.S. patent application Ser. No.12/607,074 filed Oct. 28, 2009, titled “ISOLATION AND PRESENTATION OFUNTRUSTED DATA”, the entire disclosure and contents of which are herebyincorporated by reference herein.

BACKGROUND

Software is a ubiquitous component employed for both business andpersonal purposes. While providing a great benefit, this widespread usealso provides a means for introducing unauthorized (or untrusted) codeor other types of data into computing systems for insidious purposes.Moreover, despite the threat of unauthorized data, authorized data maybe provided for download that can introduce unintended consequences. Forexample, the authorized data may not have been tested for all or a majorset of possible uses, thereby causing errors or failures in the usersystem.

In a more specific instance, the data can be a file that the userreceives in or as an attachment to an email message, or the useraccesses via a network or a database. Existing systems can flag suchfiles as potentially malicious files, and then notify the user of thispotential. However, it can be the case that the file is not malicious.The user is not offered a way to view the file to make an overridingdetermination that the file is not malicious and should be received.

One existing approach to address mitigate problem is called file block.The IT administrator can designate certain file formats to be allowed tobe opened by an application and other formats to be blocked fromopening. However, again, the user can be inundated with alert dialoguesthat cannot be properly addressed without viewing the file (or data).

SUMMARY

The following presents a simplified summary in order to provide a basicunderstanding of some novel embodiments described herein. This summaryis not an extensive overview, and it is not intended to identifykey/critical elements or to delineate the scope thereof. Its solepurpose is to present some concepts in a simplified form as a prelude tothe more detailed description that is presented later.

The disclosed architecture provides a secure environment (“sandbox”) inwhich data (e.g., code, instructions, files, images, etc.) can be openedby a client application. Moreover, once opened the data can be viewed (a“protected view”) by the user without incurring risk to other clientprocesses and systems. In other words, the architecture mitigatesmalicious attacks by enabling users to preview untrusted and potentiallyharmful data (e.g., files) in a low risk manner Files opened in theprotected view are isolated from accessing key resources on the clientcomputer and provides the user a safer way to read files that cancontain dangerous content (malware). The protected view also provides aseamless user experience in that the user is unaware that the client isoperating on data in a secure mode and thereby allows for the reductionof security prompts the user would otherwise be forced to deal with inexisting implementations.

To the accomplishment of the foregoing and related ends, certainillustrative aspects are described herein in connection with thefollowing description and the annexed drawings. These aspects areindicative of the various ways in which the principles disclosed hereincan be practiced and all aspects and equivalents thereof are intended tobe within the scope of the claimed subject matter. Other advantages andnovel features will become apparent from the following detaileddescription when considered in conjunction with the drawings.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

FIG. 1 illustrates a computer-implemented system for handling data inaccordance with the disclosed architecture.

FIG. 2 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a system for handlingand viewing data.

FIG. 3 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a data handling systemin accordance with the disclosed architecture.

FIG. 4 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a data handling systemwhere a single host process creates multiple separate sandboxenvironments for untrusted data processing and viewing.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary user interface for a protected view ofuntrusted data.

FIG. 6 illustrates a computer-implemented method of handling data.

FIG. 7 illustrates additional aspects of the method described in FIG. 6.

FIG. 8 illustrates a block diagram of a computing system operable toexecute isolated data handling and viewing in accordance with thedisclosed architecture.

FIG. 9 illustrates a schematic block diagram of a computing environmentthat supports client-based data processing of untrusted data.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The disclosed architecture provides a secure data handling mechanismwhere untrusted data (e.g., files, code, instructions, programs, media,attachments, etc.) is isolated in a sandbox environment for safeprocessing until such time as the data is deemed trusted or is to bediscarded. In accordance therewith, the architecture provides aprotected view of the untrusted data allows user interaction with theuntrusted data in a low risk manner. Data opened in protected view isisolated from accessing key resources on the user computer and providesthem a safer way to read files that can contain dangerous content. Theprotected view can be presented concurrently with a normal view oftrusted data. The protected view is graphically enhanced to distinguishthe protected view from the normal view. The architecture operates in aseamless way such that the user is unaware of operating in a differentmode that allows for the reduction of security prompts.

In other words, the “seamless” architecture allows the user to viewdocuments in a protected view without having to be aware of thebackground processes that make this occur. The view appears to the userlike a regular document opened in, for example, a word processor (and inmany respects behaves like a regular document), and the user is unawarethat there are actually two instances of the word processingapplication: one instance in a secure (“sandbox”) environment thatcommunicates with another over a communications pipe in the hostenvironment.

Additionally, since the protected view makes parsing/rendering of thecontent safer, the number of annoying prompting dialogs such as “are yousure?” can be reduced in number. These dialogs formerly stood betweenthe user and the content and in many cases provided no real securityvalue, since users got so accustomed to blindly clicking “OK”.

Reference is now made to the drawings, wherein like reference numeralsare used to refer to like elements throughout. In the followingdescription, for purposes of explanation, numerous specific details areset forth in order to provide a thorough understanding thereof. It maybe evident, however, that the novel embodiments can be practiced withoutthese specific details. In other instances, well known structures anddevices are shown in block diagram form in order to facilitate adescription thereof. The intention is to cover all modifications,equivalents, and alternatives falling within the spirit and scope of theclaimed subject matter.

FIG. 1 illustrates a computer-implemented system 100 for handling datain accordance with the disclosed architecture. The system 100 includesan isolated environment 102 (sandbox) created to process untrusted data104 using an application instance 106 of an application 108 to executethe untrusted data 104. The untrusted data 104 can be received from datasources designated as untrusted and/or of file formats designated asuntrusted. Untrusted data sources can include the Internet, downloadfolders that received data from the Internet or other networks, fileformats known to be associated with malware, a file that can includeattachments or embedded media or objects, and so on. The system 100 alsoincludes a host process 110 that interactively communicates with theisolated environment 102 based in part on interaction with the untrusteddata 104.

The isolated environment 102 and the host process 110 can beclient-based. Alternatively, the isolated environment 102 isclient-based, and the host process 110 is based remotely from the clientsystem such as on a server or another client. Still alternatively, thehost process 100 can be local and the isolated environment 102 can beremotely based, for example, on a separate desktop, separate windowstation, or separate physical machine. Each step away from the hostprocess 110 provides a greater ability to restrict the sandboxenvironment. Yet another alternative embodiment employs sandboxenvironments across local and remote locations.

The host process 110 operates on the assumption that the code in theisolated environment has been compromised by malware, and treats allmessages emanating therefrom as potentially malicious. The host process110 only performs operations that are guaranteed to be safe, regardlessof the source; otherwise, the host process 110 prompts the user forpermission before proceeding. Thus, the host process 110 only processestrustworthy messages. The untrusted data 104 can be processed using theapplication instance 106 without confirmation dialogs presented to auser of the host process 110. Alternatively, however, there are timeswhen the host process 110 will display a confirmation dialog. Forexample, when a user selects (“clicks”) a hyperlink in the document, theclick is received by the application instance 106 in the isolatedenvironment 102. In order to act on the click (e.g., by launching a webbrowser), the application instance 106 asks the host process 110 to acton its behalf. When the host process 110 receives the “please followthis hyperlink” message generated in response to the click, the hostprocess 110 requests the user's permission, since following an arbitraryand potentially maliciously constructed hyperlink is deemed not safe.

The host process 110 functions as a privileged entity and performsprivileged operations of the client system, and moreover, the hostprocess 110 monitors health of the isolated environment 102 and restartsthe isolated environment 102 due to a failure associated with theisolated environment 102.

The application 108 (and hence, application instance 106) can be part ofan application suite that provide a word processing application,spreadsheet application, presentation application, and so on. Asdescribed in FIG. 2, a protected view is introduced, which is a sandboxenvironment that helps mitigate malicious code attacks by enabling usersto preview and interact with untrusted or potentially harmful files in alow risk manner. Data (e.g., files, code, instructions, etc.) opened inprotected view is isolated from accessing key resources on the usercomputer and provides the user a safer way to read data files that cancontain dangerous content.

The protected view also provides a seamless user experience—seamless inthe sense that the look-and-feel is as if it is part of the regularapplication functionality. The user is unaware that the clientapplication is operating in an isolated mode as well, since the user isno longer prompted to confirm choices. This isolated operation allowsfor the reduction of security prompts (also referred to as confirmationdialogs). The user is able to make trusted decisions. An alternative,inferior (less seamless) implementation can require the opening of anuntrusted document in a different application (e.g., launch “protectedview word processor” rather than the word processor from a Start menu).

The protected view architecture includes the host process 110, which canbe configured to operate as a privileged entity and a client process(also referred to as the isolated “sandboxed” environment 102) wheredata (e.g., code) can run freely. Client messages from the isolatedenvironment 102 are authenticated to ensure that only trustworthymessages (communications) are processed, the messages related to thehost process 110 and the isolated environment 102.

The protected view architecture provides resiliency to the client systemfrom bad or misbehaving data by monitoring the health of the clientprocesses. In the event the client process (e.g., isolated environment102) is no longer responding, the host process 110 terminates the clientprocess, restarts the client process, and provides the user the optionto reload the failed files.

Not that although described herein as the application instance 106 beinga copy of the application 108, this is not a requirement. For example,application 108 can be an email (messaging) application, whereas theapplication instance 106 can be a word processor application, and theapplication combination is used to safely preview word processorattachments in an email message. It is within contemplation that anapplication framework is provided where sandbox applications areregistered with the host application 108, such that the host application108 can load any number of these applications in the sandbox, using apre-defined communications protocol and set of messages (e.g., over anamed pipe).

For example, an application developer can develop an attachmentpreviewer for application file formats, and then register it with anemail application. The email application can then load that previewer inthe sandbox to securely preview those particular file formats. These arebasically variants of the system 400 of FIG. 4, having one hostapplication that launches numerous instances of other applications inthe sandbox.

In one implementation, the host process 110 can intercept all useractions prior to sending the user actions to the sandboxed process (theapplication instance 106). This allows the host process 110 to fullyauthenticate all user actions, and not those actions in the host processarea.

FIG. 2 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a system 200 forhandling and viewing data. The system 200 includes the components andentities of the system 100 of FIG. 1, as well as other components andentities such as a view component 202. The view component 202 provides aprotected view 204 of the untrusted data being processed in the isolatedenvironment 102. Trusted data 206 is run in the host process 110 usingthe application 108. The host process 110 interfaces to a client systemdesktop 208, which is a graphical environment that functions as thecentral user interface to client processes and programs. The trusteddata 206 (presented as a normal view 210) and the untrusted data 104(presented in the protected view 204) can be presented on the clientsystem desktop 208, but more beneficially, as part of a singleapplication or process. The protected view 204 is made graphicallydistinguishable from the normal view 210 to disambiguate datapresentation to the client user. In other words, the user can view boththe trusted data 206 and the untrusted data 104, concurrently, as ifpart of a single application or process.

The system 200 can also include a host broker component 212 thatfunctions to handle communications between the host process 110 and theisolated environment 102 (e.g., an isolated client process).

Put another way, the system 200 can include the isolated client process(the isolated environment 102) without access to client system resourcescreated for processing the untrusted data 104 using the applicationinstance 106 of the application 108 to process the untrusted data 104.The system 200 can also include the host process, with access to theclient system resources, which communicates with the isolated clientprocess using request/response communications. The view component 202facilitates viewing of the untrusted data 104 being processed in theisolated client process.

The host broker component 212 routes communications between the hostprocess 110 and the isolated client process. The application instance106 and application 108 are one of a word processor program, spreadsheetprogram, or presentation program, for example, or applications of anoffice suite of applications.

The view component 202 presents the untrusted data in the protected view204 that is made graphically distinguishable from the normal view 210 ofthe trusted data 206. The normal view 210 and the protected view 204 canbe presented as if part of a single application and/or on the clientdesktop 208.

The host process 110 authenticates messages from the isolated clientprocess and processes only trustworthy messages. This authentication canbe performed by the host process 110, by the host broker component 212,or via a combination of the host process 110 and the host brokercomponent 212. The host process 110 can be configured to act as aprivileged process to authenticate all client messages and perform onlythe trustworthy messages. The host process 110 performs privilegedoperations (e.g., access to system resources, obtaining user passwords,etc.). A compromise in the host process 110 can result in a compromisein the entire architecture.

The host process 110 can determine the health of the client processes(e.g., isolated environment 102). In the event a client process is nolonger responding the host process 110 can terminate the client process,restart the client process, and provide the user options to reload thefailed files.

As previously indicated, the isolated client process is where theuntrusted data executes. The isolated client process can contain one ormore instances of a dangerous application. Malware or bad code isexpected to run freely within the isolated client process and is notable to harm the end-user data. This client-side isolation limits accessby the untrusted data to key operating system resources. The keyoperating system resources can include, but are not limited to, files,registry keys, user interface components (e.g., windows) owned by otherprocesses, named kernel objects (e.g., pipes, shared memory, etc.), andso on. In a more robust implementation, the key resources can includethings such as network sockets as well.

The disclosed architecture provides an extensibility model whereapplication developers can write code to be aware of the isolationprocessing and data handling and build custom solutions that performcorrectly in this isolated environment. To the end user it will appearthe end user is using one application when in fact parts of the userinterface are running in the host process and other parts are running inthe isolated client process. Accordingly, when gestures are performedthat are part of the host process user interface, the user no longerneeds to be prompted with confirmation dialogs since there is a highassurance that the gestures came from the user and not malicious coderunning with in the client sandbox environment. Files that have beendeemed restricted or appear unsafe can now be opened in this newarchitecture, where in the past, these files would be blocked from beingopened with a security prompt.

FIG. 3 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a data handling system300 in accordance with the disclosed architecture. The system 300includes the isolated environment 102 created for processing untrusteddata using an application instance 106 of the host application 108, thehost process 110, and associated host broker component 212. In thisembodiment, the isolated environment 102 also includes a sandbox brokercomponent 302 for directly interfacing to the host broker component 212to handle messaging (communications) between the host process 110 andisolated environment 102, such as via a named pipe. The messaginghandled by the broker components (212 and 302) can also include thecommunications of a preview handler between the host application 108 andapplication instance 106. Note that where the isolated environment 102does not include the sandbox broker component 302, the host brokercomponent 212 can process the preview handler messages directly from theapplication instance 106.

The system 300 also depicts two windows: a first host window 304 forviewing the normal view 210 of the trusted data, and a second hostwindow 306 for viewing the protected view 204 of the untrusted data. Thefirst host window 304 shows a menu system and status bar. Similarly, thesecond host window 306 shows the same menu system and status bar. Themenu systems and status bars are the same because the host application108 and the application instance 106 are the same. It is to beunderstood that these are just a few examples of the many possiblefunctional and graphical similarities that can occur between theapplication window since the settings of the host application 108 areduplicated when creating the application instance 106.

As shown, the host application 108 handles all processes for presentingthe normal view of the trusted data, menu/status bar, etc., in the firsthost window 304, and the menu/status bar, etc., in the second hostwindow 306. However, the application instance 106 of the isolatedenvironment 102 presents the protected view of the untrusted data in thesecond host window 306. The host application 108 provides distinguishingemphasis to the second host window 306 to clearly distinguish visuallythe normal view 210 from the protected view 204.

The capabilities and features provided by a fully functional application(e.g., the host application 108) can be restricted for the applicationinstance 106 in the isolated environment 102. For example, the user isallowed to interact with the untrusted data (e.g., a document) usingsome capabilities provided when in read-only mode such as scroll,search, resize columns, zoom in and out, etc.

The system 300 can also include a decision component 308 that receivesdata and then determines if the data is trusted or untrusted, andwhether the data will be processed in protected view (data is deemedrisky) or normal view (data is deemed safe). The result of thisdetermination is then passed to the host process 110. The criteria fordetermination can be based on the source of the data (e.g., emailattachments from outside the user organization or files downloaded fromthe Internet can be deemed risky, but files located in a folderdesignated as “trusted” can be deemed to be safe), and if the dataformat is tagged by a system administrator as being risky (e.g., thecode that parses earlier version of word processor documents canreasonably be considered to be less secure than the code that parses amore recent version of word processor documents).

Additionally, other criteria can include whether the data fails somekind of “schema” check (e.g., appears corrupted or otherwise invalid),and whether the user has already chosen to edit the data in the past(e.g., if the user chose to leave protected view once, same data willnot be sent back to protected view the next time). Still other factorscan include the results of a virus scan of the data, the data isassociated with some kind of social mechanism (e.g., other users saidthis data was risky, so the data is deemed risky in this instance),whether the data is digitally signed, and whether the certificate istrustworthy. These are only a few examples of the criteria that can beemployed and is not to be construed as so limiting.

FIG. 4 illustrates an alternative embodiment of a data handling system400 where a single host process creates multiple separate sandboxenvironments for untrusted data processing and viewing. Here, a firsthost process 402 is associated with a first host application 404 (e.g.,a word processing program) that operates on first trusted data 406. Iffirst untrusted data 408 is received by the first host process 402, anassociated first isolated environment 410 is automatically created inwhich to process the first untrusted data 408. Additionally, a firstapplication instance 412 is automatically created (by a duplicationcomponent, for creating a copy of the first host application 404 and itsassociated settings) and employed in the first isolated environment 410.

The first host process 402 is also associated with a first host brokercomponent 414 that facilitates the communication of specific messagesbetween the first host process 402 and the first isolated environment410. The first broker component 414 provides communications isolationbetween potential malware associated with the first untrusted data 408of the first isolated environment 410 and operations of the first hostprocess 402. Message authentication can be performed by the first brokercomponent 414 to ensure that only trustworthy messaging will beprocessed by the first host process 402.

A second host process 416 is associated with a second host application418 (e.g., a spreadsheet program) that operates on second trusted data420. If second untrusted data 422 is received by the second host process416, an associated second isolated environment 424 is automaticallycreated in which to process the second untrusted data 422. Additionally,a second application instance 426 is automatically created (by aduplication component, which can be the same or different duplicationcomponent utilized for the first host process 402, for creating a copyof the second host application 418 and its associated settings) andemployed in the second isolated environment 424.

The second host process 416 is also associated with a second host brokercomponent 428 that facilitates the communication of specific messagesbetween the second host process 416 and the second isolated environment424. The second broker component 428 provides communications isolationbetween potential malware associated with the second untrusted data 422of the second isolated environment 424 and operations associated withthe second host process 416. Message authentication can be performed bythe second broker component 428 to ensure that only trustworthymessaging will be processed by the second host process 416.

In other words, a host process can create multiple isolated environmentseach hosting its own separate piece of untrusted content. The multipleisolated environments can further be isolated from each other (and notjust isolated from the host and rest of the computer); however, this canbe an implementation detail, since one isolation environment need not bedesigned to be isolated from another isolated environment whenprocessing associated untrusted data.

The data handling system 400 also includes the client system desktop 208for presenting normal views of trusted data and protected views ofuntrusted data. Here, several types of views can be presented: a firstnormal view 430 (similar to window 304 of FIG. 3) of the first trusteddata 406 (via the first host application 404), a first protected view432 (similar to window 306 of FIG. 3) of the first untrusted data 408(via the first host application 404), a second normal view 434 (similarto window 304 of FIG. 3) of the second trusted data 420 (via the secondhost application 418), and a second protected view 436 (similar towindow 306 of FIG. 3) of the second untrusted data 422 (via the secondhost application 418).

Alternatively, it can be the case where a single broker component can beemployed to handle the communications between all host processes (e.g.,first host process 402 and second host process 416) and isolatedenvironments (e.g., first isolated environment 410 and second isolatedenvironment 424) rather than each process having its own brokercomponent.

As before, the host processes and isolated environments can all belocated on the same client system. Alternatively, the host process canbe located remote from the client-side isolated environments. Stillalternatively, the first host process 402 can be located remotely, whilethe second host process 416, first isolated environment 410, and secondisolated environment 424 are located on the client system.

The views 438, since all based on the same type of application (e.g.,word processor) can be presented in windows that from the perspective ofthe user appear to all be from the same application or process. Inanother implementation, the views 438 can be in separate windowsaccording to the data (e.g., Data₁, Data₂) or in separate windowsaccording to trusted and untrusted, for example.

FIG. 5 illustrates an exemplary user interface 500 for a protected viewof untrusted data. The host area 502 (denoted in crosshatching forillustrations purposes only) denotes the host process. Any user actionssuch as button clicks, toolbar clicks, etc., in the host area 502 aredeemed authenticated and do not generate a confirmation dialog to whichthe user will need to respond. Contrariwise, in the isolated area 504(denoted in gray for illustrations purposes only), all user gesturesfrom the process are considered unauthenticated and can trigger aconfirmation dialog to which the user will respond. The client systemshows two running host processes of the application.

Included herein is a set of flow charts representative of exemplarymethodologies for performing novel aspects of the disclosedarchitecture. While, for purposes of simplicity of explanation, the oneor more methodologies shown herein, for example, in the form of a flowchart or flow diagram, are shown and described as a series of acts, itis to be understood and appreciated that the methodologies are notlimited by the order of acts, as some acts may, in accordance therewith,occur in a different order and/or concurrently with other acts from thatshown and described herein. For example, those skilled in the art willunderstand and appreciate that a methodology could alternatively berepresented as a series of interrelated states or events, such as in astate diagram. Moreover, not all acts illustrated in a methodology maybe required for a novel implementation.

FIG. 6 illustrates a computer-implemented method of handling data. At600, an isolated client environment is created in which to processuntrusted data received from a data source. The isolated clientenvironment can be created in direct response to an indication that thedata received is untrusted. It can also be the scenario thatdetermination is not based on the data itself but an untrusted datasource, domain, network, etc. At 602, the untrusted data is processed inthe isolated client environment using an application instance of anapplication employed for processing trusted data. For example, a wordprocessing application employed as a trusted host process is duplicatedfor use in the isolated client environment to run the untrusted data(e.g., file, code, instructions, programs, etc.).

At 604, communications between the isolated client environment and ahost process is routed via a host broker. The host broker can be aprogram (e.g., DLL (dynamic link library)). At 606, a protected view ofthe untrusted data is presented from the isolated client environment asbeing processed by the application instance.

FIG. 7 illustrates additional aspects of the method described in FIG. 6.At 700, the protected view is graphically distinguished from aconcurrently presented normal view of the trusted data on a clientdesktop. In other words, the user interface can present a normal view oftrusted data (e.g., files) be run by an application and the protectedview of the untrusted data being run by the application instance. Thisoccurs seamlessly to the client user, but to ensure the user knows whichview is trusted or untrusted, graphical emphasis (e.g., window colors,border coloring, text notifications, window background coloring, etc.)can be applied to the protected view.

The untrusted data can be an untrusted file opened in the isolatedclient environment using the application instance and presented via theprotected view. At 702, communications from the isolated clientenvironment is authenticated using the host broker. At 704, thepresentation of security prompts is reduced based on the authentication.At 706, the isolated client environment is automatically terminated andrestarted when the isolated client environment fails to respondappropriately. This can be due to the untrusted data causing abnormalbehavior of the application instance such that the isolated environmentlocks up, for example. Alternatively, this can be due to initialappropriate behavior of the application instance changing because ofmalware impacting normal operation the application instance. At 708, thehost process is run as a privileged entity.

As used in this application, the terms “component” and “system” areintended to refer to a computer-related entity, either hardware, acombination of hardware and software, software, or software inexecution. For example, a component can be, but is not limited to being,a process running on a processor, a processor, a hard disk drive,multiple storage drives (of optical, solid state, and/or magneticstorage medium), an object, an executable, a thread of execution, aprogram, and/or a computer. By way of illustration, both an applicationrunning on a server and the server can be a component. One or morecomponents can reside within a process and/or thread of execution, and acomponent can be localized on one computer and/or distributed betweentwo or more computers. The word “exemplary” may be used herein to meanserving as an example, instance, or illustration. Any aspect or designdescribed herein as “exemplary” is not necessarily to be construed aspreferred or advantageous over other aspects or designs.

Referring now to FIG. 8, there is illustrated a block diagram of acomputing system 800 operable to execute isolated data handling andviewing in accordance with the disclosed architecture. In order toprovide additional context for various aspects thereof, FIG. 8 and thefollowing discussion are intended to provide a brief, generaldescription of the suitable computing system 800 in which the variousaspects can be implemented. While the description above is in thegeneral context of computer-executable instructions that can run on oneor more computers, those skilled in the art will recognize that a novelembodiment also can be implemented in combination with other programmodules and/or as a combination of hardware and software.

The computing system 800 for implementing various aspects includes thecomputer 802 having processing unit(s) 804, a system memory 806, and asystem bus 808. The processing unit(s) 804 can be any of variouscommercially available processors such as single-processor,multi-processor, single-core units and multi-core units. Moreover, thoseskilled in the art will appreciate that the novel methods can bepracticed with other computer system configurations, includingminicomputers, mainframe computers, as well as personal computers (e.g.,desktop, laptop, etc.), hand-held computing devices,microprocessor-based or programmable consumer electronics, and the like,each of which can be operatively coupled to one or more associateddevices.

The system memory 806 can include volatile (VOL) memory 810 (e.g.,random access memory (RAM)) and non-volatile memory (NON-VOL) 812 (e.g.,ROM, EPROM, EEPROM, etc.). A basic input/output system (BIOS) can bestored in the non-volatile memory 812, and includes the basic routinesthat facilitate the communication of data and signals between componentswithin the computer 802, such as during startup. The volatile memory 810can also include a high-speed RAM such as static RAM for caching data.

The system bus 808 provides an interface for system componentsincluding, but not limited to, the memory subsystem 806 to theprocessing unit(s) 804. The system bus 808 can be any of several typesof bus structure that can further interconnect to a memory bus (with orwithout a memory controller), and a peripheral bus (e.g., PCI, PCIe,AGP, LPC, etc.), using any of a variety of commercially available busarchitectures.

The computer 802 further includes storage subsystem(s) 814 and storageinterface(s) 816 for interfacing the storage subsystem(s) 814 to thesystem bus 808 and other desired computer components. The storagesubsystem(s) 814 can include one or more of a hard disk drive (HDD), amagnetic floppy disk drive (FDD), and/or optical disk storage drive(e.g., a CD-ROM drive DVD drive), for example. The storage interface(s)816 can include interface technologies such as EIDE, ATA, SATA, and IEEE1394, for example.

One or more programs and data can be stored in the memory subsystem 806,a removable memory subsystem 818 (e.g., flash drive form factortechnology), and/or the storage subsystem(s) 814 (e.g., optical,magnetic, solid state), including an operating system 820, one or moreapplication programs 822, other program modules 824, and program data826.

The one or more application programs 822, other program modules 824, andprogram data 826 can include one or more of the following: thecomponents and entities of system 100 of FIG. 1, the components andentities of system 200 of FIG. 2, the components and entities of system300 of FIG. 3, the components and entities of system 400 of FIG. 4, theuser interface 500 and, the method and steps of FIGS. 6-7, for example.

Generally, programs include routines, methods, data structures, othersoftware components, etc., that perform particular tasks or implementparticular abstract data types. All or portions of the operating system820, applications 822, modules 824, and/or data 826 can also be cachedin memory such as the volatile memory 810, for example. It is to beappreciated that the disclosed architecture can be implemented withvarious commercially available operating systems or combinations ofoperating systems (e.g., as virtual machines).

The storage subsystem(s) 814 and memory subsystems (806 and 818) serveas computer readable media for volatile and non-volatile storage ofdata, data structures, computer-executable instructions, and so forth.Computer readable media can be any available media that can be accessedby the computer 802 and includes volatile and non-volatile media,removable and non-removable media. For the computer 802, the mediaaccommodate the storage of data in any suitable digital format. Itshould be appreciated by those skilled in the art that other types ofcomputer readable media can be employed such as zip drives, magnetictape, flash memory cards, cartridges, and the like, for storing computerexecutable instructions for performing the novel methods of thedisclosed architecture.

A user can interact with the computer 802, programs, and data usingexternal user input devices 828 such as a keyboard and a mouse. Otherexternal user input devices 828 can include a microphone, an IR(infrared) remote control, a joystick, a game pad, camera recognitionsystems, a stylus pen, touch screen, gesture systems (e.g., eyemovement, head movement, etc.), and/or the like. The user can interactwith the computer 802, programs, and data using onboard user inputdevices 830 such a touchpad, microphone, keyboard, etc., where thecomputer 802 is a portable computer, for example. These and other inputdevices are connected to the processing unit(s) 804 through input/output(I/O) device interface(s) 832 via the system bus 808, but can beconnected by other interfaces such as a parallel port, IEEE 1394 serialport, a game port, a USB port, an IR interface, etc. The I/O deviceinterface(s) 832 also facilitate the use of output peripherals 834 suchas printers, audio devices, camera devices, and so on, such as a soundcard and/or onboard audio processing capability.

One or more graphics interface(s) 836 (also commonly referred to as agraphics processing unit (GPU)) provide graphics and video signalsbetween the computer 802 and external display(s) 838 (e.g., LCD, plasma)and/or onboard displays 840 (e.g., for portable computer). The graphicsinterface(s) 836 can also be manufactured as part of the computer systemboard.

The computer 802 can operate in a networked environment (e.g., IP-based)using logical connections via a wired/wireless communications subsystem842 to one or more networks and/or other computers. The other computerscan include workstations, servers, routers, personal computers,microprocessor-based entertainment appliances, peer devices or othercommon network nodes, and typically include many or all of the elementsdescribed relative to the computer 802. The logical connections caninclude wired/wireless connectivity to a local area network (LAN), awide area network (WAN), hotspot, and so on. LAN and WAN networkingenvironments are commonplace in offices and companies and facilitateenterprise-wide computer networks, such as intranets, all of which mayconnect to a global communications network such as the Internet.

When used in a networking environment the computer 802 connects to thenetwork via a wired/wireless communication subsystem 842 (e.g., anetwork interface adapter, onboard transceiver subsystem, etc.) tocommunicate with wired/wireless networks, wired/wireless printers,wired/wireless input devices 844, and so on. The computer 802 caninclude a modem or other means for establishing communications over thenetwork. In a networked environment, programs and data relative to thecomputer 802 can be stored in the remote memory/storage device, as isassociated with a distributed system. It will be appreciated that thenetwork connections shown are exemplary and other means of establishinga communications link between the computers can be used.

The computer 802 is operable to communicate with wired/wireless devicesor entities using the radio technologies such as the IEEE 802.xx familyof standards, such as wireless devices operatively disposed in wirelesscommunication (e.g., IEEE 802.11 over-the-air modulation techniques)with, for example, a printer, scanner, desktop and/or portable computer,personal digital assistant (PDA), communications satellite, any piece ofequipment or location associated with a wirelessly detectable tag (e.g.,a kiosk, news stand, restroom), and telephone. This includes at leastWi-Fi (or Wireless Fidelity) for hotspots, WiMax, and Bluetooth™wireless technologies. Thus, the communications can be a predefinedstructure as with a conventional network or simply an ad hoccommunication between at least two devices. Wi-Fi networks use radiotechnologies called IEEE 802.11x (a, b, g, etc.) to provide secure,reliable, fast wireless connectivity. A Wi-Fi network can be used toconnect computers to each other, to the Internet, and to wire networks(which use IEEE 802.3-related media and functions).

The illustrated aspects can also be practiced in distributed computingenvironments where certain tasks are performed by remote processingdevices that are linked through a communications network. In adistributed computing environment, program modules can be located inlocal and/or remote storage and/or memory system.

Referring now to FIG. 9, there is illustrated a schematic block diagramof a computing environment 900 that supports client-based dataprocessing of untrusted data. For example, the computing environment 900can include the isolated client process and a remote host process (e.g.,a server-based process, or another client-based host process) forcommunicating with the isolated client process for authentication andisolation from other client processes.

The environment 900 includes one or more client(s) 902. The client(s)902 can be hardware and/or software (e.g., threads, processes, computingdevices). The client(s) 902 can house cookie(s) and/or associatedcontextual information, for example. The environment 900 also includesone or more server(s) 904. The server(s) 904 can also be hardware and/orsoftware (e.g., threads, processes, computing devices). The servers 904can house threads to perform transformations by employing thearchitecture, for example. One possible communication between a client902 and a server 904 can be in the form of a data packet adapted to betransmitted between two or more computer processes. The data packet mayinclude a cookie and/or associated contextual information, for example.The environment 900 includes a communication framework 906 (e.g., aglobal communication network such as the Internet) that can be employedto facilitate communications between the client(s) 902 and the server(s)904.

Communications can be facilitated via a wire (including optical fiber)and/or wireless technology. The client(s) 902 are operatively connectedto one or more client data store(s) 908 that can be employed to storeinformation local to the client(s) 902 (e.g., cookie(s) and/orassociated contextual information). Similarly, the server(s) 904 areoperatively connected to one or more server data store(s) 910 that canbe employed to store information local to the servers 904.

What has been described above includes examples of the disclosedarchitecture. It is, of course, not possible to describe everyconceivable combination of components and/or methodologies, but one ofordinary skill in the art may recognize that many further combinationsand permutations are possible. Accordingly, the novel architecture isintended to embrace all such alterations, modifications and variationsthat fall within the spirit and scope of the appended claims.Furthermore, to the extent that the term “includes” is used in eitherthe detailed description or the claims, such term is intended to beinclusive in a manner similar to the term “comprising” as “comprising”is interpreted when employed as a transitional word in a claim.

What is claimed is:
 1. A system for processing untrusted data, thesystem comprising: a processor; and a memory in communication with theprocessor, the memory having computer-readable instructions storedthereupon that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor toperform a method comprising performing a schema check on data receivedfrom a data source to determine that the data received comprises theuntrusted data, the schema check indicating that the data received iscorrupted; determining that the data received comprises trusted data bydetermining that a user has previously chosen to edit the data received;creating an isolated client environment in which to process theuntrusted data in response to determining that the data receivedcomprises untrusted data; processing the untrusted data in the isolatedclient environment using an application instance of an application, theapplication being configured to process trusted data; routingcommunications between the isolated client environment and a hostprocess via a host broker; and presenting a protected view and a normalview within a user interface, the protected view comprising a view ofthe untrusted data from the isolated client environment, and the normalview comprising a view of the trusted data processed by the application.2. The system of claim 1, wherein the protected view is graphicallydistinguishable from the normal view.
 3. The system of claim 1, whereinthe untrusted data comprises an untrusted file opened in the isolatedclient environment using the application instance and presented via theprotected view.
 4. The system of claim 1, wherein the method furthercomprises authenticating communications from the isolated clientenvironment using the host broker.
 5. The system of claim 4, whereinpresenting the protected view comprises presenting the protected viewwithout generating a security prompt.
 6. The system of claim 1, whereinthe method further comprises terminating and restarting the isolatedclient environment in response to determining that the isolated clienthas failed to respond appropriately.
 7. The system of claim 1, whereinthe method further comprises executing the host process as a privilegedentity.
 8. A system for processing untrusted data, the systemcomprising: a processor; and a memory in communication with theprocessor, the memory having computer-readable instructions storedthereupon that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor toperform a method comprising performing a virus scan on data receivedfrom a data source to determine that the data received comprises theuntrusted data; determining that the data received comprises trusteddata by determining that a user has previously chosen to edit the datareceived; in response to determining that the data received comprisesuntrusted data, create an isolated client environment in which toprocess the untrusted data received from a data source; processing theuntrusted data in the isolated client environment using an applicationinstance of an application, the application being configured to processthe trusted data; routing communications between the isolated clientenvironment and a host process via a host broker; and presenting a viewcomprising a protected view and a normal view, the protected viewcomprising a view of the untrusted data from the isolated clientenvironment, and the normal view comprising a view of the trusted dataprocessed by the application.
 9. The system of claim 8, wherein the viewcomprises a user interface concurrently presenting the protected viewand the normal view, wherein the protected view is graphicallydistinguishable from the normal view within the user interface, whereinthe host process is configured to authenticate messages from within theprotected view prior to processing, and wherein the host process isconfigured to treat messages from within the normal view asauthenticated.
 10. The system of claim 8, wherein the untrusted datacomprises an untrusted file opened in the isolated client environmentusing the application instance and presented via the protected view. 11.The system of claim 8, wherein the method further comprisesauthenticating communications from the isolated client environment usingthe host broker.
 12. The system of claim 8, wherein the method furthercomprises terminating and restarting the isolated client environment inresponse to determining that the isolated client has failed to respondappropriately.
 13. The system of claim 8, wherein the method furthercomprises executing the host process as a privileged entity.
 14. Thesystem of claim 8, wherein the untrusted data comprises data receivedfrom an untrusted data source in communication with the computer. 15.The system of claim 8, wherein the untrusted data comprises dataformatted in a file format designated by the computer as an untrustedfile format.
 16. A computer-implemented method of processing untrusteddata, the, computer-implemented method comprising: performing a virusscan on data received from a data source to determine that the datareceived comprises the untrusted data; determining that the datareceived comprises trusted data by determining that a user haspreviously chosen to edit the data received; in response to determiningthat the data received comprises untrusted data, creating an isolatedclient environment in which to process the untrusted data received froma data source; processing the untrusted data in the isolated clientenvironment using an application instance of an application, theapplication being configured to process the trusted data; routingcommunications between the isolated client environment and a hostprocess via a host broker; and presenting a view comprising a protectedview and a normal view, the protected view comprising a view of theuntrusted data from the isolated client environment, and the normal viewcomprising a view of the trusted data processed by the application. 17.The method of claim 16, wherein the view comprises a user interfaceconcurrently presenting the protected view and the normal view, whereinthe protected view is graphically distinguishable from the normal viewwithin the user interface, wherein the host process is configured toauthenticate messages from within the protected view prior toprocessing, and wherein the host process is configured to treat messagesfrom within the normal view as authenticated.
 18. The method of claim16, wherein the untrusted data comprises an untrusted file opened in theisolated client environment using the application instance and presentedvia the protected view.
 19. The method of claim 16, further comprising,authenticating communications from the isolated client environment usingthe host broker.
 20. The method of claim 16, further comprising,terminating and restarting the isolated client environment in responseto determining that the isolated client has failed to respondappropriately.
 21. The method of claim 16, further comprising, executingthe host process as a privileged entity.
 22. The method of claim 16,wherein the untrusted data comprises data received from an untrusteddata source in communication with the computer.
 23. The method of claim16, wherein the untrusted data comprises data formatted in a file formatdesignated by the computer as an untrusted file format.